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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE

OF

UTAH

JEANNIE V. HAMILTON,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
Case No.14456

:

vs.
ROBERT EARL HAMILTON,
GEORGE POULSEN, and MRS.
GEORGE POULSEN,

:

Defendants-Respondents. '
•

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
NATURE OF CASE
Appellant brought this action seeking a decree
quieting claims of respondents to either

1) a 1/2 undivided

interest in the subject real property, or 2) an undivided
1/3 interest in the subject real property.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
This matter was submitted to the Court by both
parties on Motions for Summary Judgment with Depositions
and Transcripts of Trial submitted as Affidavits. The
District Court for the Fifth Judicial District in Millard
County, the Honorable J. Harlan Burns presiding, entered
its judgment decreeing respondents, George Poulsen, to be
the owner of the subject real property and quieted title
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against the claims of the appellant and granted respondent,
George Poulsen, his costs.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks an order of this Court vacating the
judgment rendered by the trial court and remanding the case
for further proceedings.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The appellant was married to the defendant, Pvobert
Earl Hamilton in November of 1964 in Las Vegas, Nevada.
(T [1975] 3:18) (D 3:16).

From approximately October, 1965

through April, 1968, the Hamiltons resided in California.
(D 3:17-20).
On November 22, 1967 (T [1973] 8:8) the property
in issue was purchased by defendant's (Pvobert Earl Hamilton)
father, to-wit: Mr. A„ V. Hamilton, for the purchase price of
$11,500.00 (T ]1973] 8:4) in the name of his-son, Pvobert
Earl Hamilton, as and for the benefit of defendant's Pvobert
Earl Hamilton, family.

(T [1973] 11:5-14).

In the Spring of 1968 the Hamilton family moved from
California to Millard County, Utah (T [1973] 4:11-15) where
they resided on the subject real property for approximately
13 months until the appellant returned to California in May
of 1969. (T [1973] 4:16-20).
In Civil No. 5843 in Millard County, (T[1969]) the
appellant pursued a divorce action against the defendant,
Robert Earl Hamilton.

The Complaint in said action was filed
.-2-
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on May 28, 1969, (T [1975] 3:18-19) and the hearing on the
case was held before the Honorable James P. McCune on December 8, 1969, (T [1969]; T [1975] 3:20-21). The Court found
that the appellant was entitled to an interlocutory decree of
divorce and orally granted such decree of divorce to her
(T [1969] 32:9-16). The Court stated further that the decree
would be final in all respects except as to the real property,
including the x^ater stock and equipment that goes with the
farm itself (T [1975] 4:9-12 and T [1969] 38:25-30). The
actual interlocutory decree of divorce was not signed and
filed by Judge McCune until April 16, 1970, (T [1975] 5:1114) which decree purported to require that the real property
here involved and including other real property owned by
the parties and 50 shares of water ''should remain in joint
ownership as tenants in common until the Court, by further
Order, directs distribution or division of said property.ff
(T [1975] 5:19-29).
On March 13, 1970, (D 3:17-19) during the time the
final division of the real property was pending, the
defendant, Robert Earl Hamilton, representing himself to be
"a single man11.

(D 6:18-19, 10:17-21) conveyed by Warranty

Deed to George J. Poulsen the real property involved in this
litigation (T [1975] 4:22-25).

The Warranty Deed was duly

acknowledged by Robert E. Hamilton as a single man before
Rodney Adams at Fillmore, Utah and was recorded in the
office of the Millard County Recorder's Office on March
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31, 1970 in Book 77 at page 519 (T [1975] 5: 15-16). Since
that time the respondent George Poulsen has held title to
and has claimed possession of said property,
ARGUMENT
I
THE APPELLANT IS ENTITLED TO AN UNDIVIDED 1/2
INTEREST IN THE REAL PROPERTY SOLD BY THE DEFENDANT, ROBERT
EARL HAMILTON, AS A SINGLE MAN, TO RESPONDENTS, POULSENS;
OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE, THE APPELLANT IS ENTITLED TO A 1/3
INTEREST IN THE SUBJECT REAL PROPERTY.
Ae

At the time of the sale of the subject real

property, the appellant was entitled to a 1/3 statutory
interest.
The statement of facts satisfy the requirements of
Section 74-4-3, Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended)
creating in appellant, as wife, an inchoate statute interest
in one-third of the subject property. Said interest
attached to the property when acquired, and was still
attached to the property in March, 1970, when Robert Earl
Hamilton deeded the property to the respondents, Poulsens.
There is no evidence of any relinquishment of this statutory
interest by the appellant, and no factual issue has been
raised in this regard.
The legal effect of the conveyance of the property
by Robert Hamilton to the Poulsens in March, 1970, was to
transfer the interest which he had, but subject to the
statutory interest of the wife.

As stated in In Re Madsen's
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Estate, 123 U. 327, 259 P. 2d (1953), at page 603:
It (the wife's dower right) does not affect the seisin
of the husband's grantee. He acquires the title that
vested in the husband by the deed. The grantee has
the legal title encumbered by the dower unless the wife
has by proper written instrument freed the title of
the encumbrance.
Even though the trial court found that the Poulsens
purchased without actual notice of appellant's statutory
interest, this did not give them the status of bona fide
purchasers for value or free the property from her claim.
Nor are the wife's rights affected by the husband's
representations that he is unmarried.

This principle was

affirmed in the case of Hilton v. Sloan, 37 U. 359, 103 P.
689 (1910) at page 696.

In that case, estoppel by the wife

was found to be present, which defeated her dower claim.
There is no evidence of estoppel in our case.
Thus, the law is clear on the facts that at any point
in time between the conveyance (March 31, 1970) and the
signing of the Interlocutory Divorce Decree (April 14, 1970)
any title to the property held by the Poulsens was subject
to the appellant's statutory interest, x^hether the Poulsens
knew of it or not.
B.

There exists a correlation betx>7een the wife's

statutory interest and a property division which takes place
at the time of divorce.
It may be conceded that as a general rule a divorce
terminates the wife's statutory interest.

25 Am Jur 2d 192,

Dower and Curtesy § 141. However, under Section 30-3-5,
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended), the court is vested
with jurisdiction, at the time of divorce, to "make such
orders in relation to . . .property . . .as may be equitable;
•

©

©

This statute has always been interpreted as permitting
the Court, by Decree, to give the wife an interest in her
husband1s property, as well as permitting the division of
property held in both names. (For an example, see Pinion v.
Pinion, 92 U. 255, 67 P., 2d 265 (1937). "If her husband
has property, and she would go forth penniless, the situation
would merit a property division.11)
In fact, one-third is usually considered a fair
proportion to award the wife in such divisions although
the Court has discretion to modify this percentage depending
on the facts of each particular case. Woolley v. Woolley,
113 U. 391, 195 P. 2d 743 (1948), at page 745.

(In the

final divorce decree in the case at hand, the judge chose
to go even further, granting a one-half undivided interest
to the appellant.)
This apparent correlation between the wife's statutory
right and property division rights at divorce is further
enhanced by examining the purpose of each.
As to the wifefs statutory interest, it has been said
that the law favors the wife's statutory right and is
tenacious in protecting this right in her husband's estate.
Hilton v. Sloan, 37 U. 359, 108 P. 689 (1910), at page 696.
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As stated in In Re Madsenfs Estate, 123 U. 327, 259 P. 2d
595 (1953), at page 602:
We recognise it to be the fact that the right of
dower or its statutory equivalent has always been
highly favored in the law. It is one of the most
ancient of our principles, dating back into
antiquity . . . The wife's sustenance is a matter
of great concern. The purpose of the law is to
assure proper support of the widow after the death
of her husband.
The policy of the law granting property division to
the wife upon divorce is substantially the same.

In

MacDonald v. MacDonald, 120 U. 573, 236 P. 2d 1066 (1951),
the rule is stated that where there are sufficient assets
and income to do so, a wife is entitled to be provided for
according to her station in life and as demanded by her
condition of health and lack of ability to work.

The Utah

Supreme Court reaffirmed this rule in Wilson v. Wilson,
5 U. 2d 79, 296 P. 2d 977 (1956) by stating it was the
court's responsibility, in dividing property and awarding
alimony in divorce judgment, flto endeavor to provide a
just and equitable adjustment of parties' economic resources
so that the parties can reconstruct their lives on a happy
and useful basis."
The actions of the defendant, Mr. Hamilton, in selling
the subject property to the respondents, Poulsens, before
the final divorce decree was signed, frusturated the efforts
of the court to accomplish this end.
In the case at hand, the Divorce Decree, as beteen
the parties to it, awarded appellant a one-half undivided
interest in the subject property, as a tenant in common,
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Although the Decree is somewhat ambiguous as to whether
joint tenancy or tenancy in common was intended, a fair
construction of Section 57-1-6, Utah Code Annotated (1953
as amended) favors tenancy in common.

In either event, the

appellant's interest would be the equivalent of an undivided
one-half interest. 156 A. L. R, 515, 516.
The wife's statutory right at the time of sale insured
her a one-third interest in the property at that time. To
allow the property to pass from the defendant, Robert Earl
Hamilton, to the respondents, Poulsens, while Ignoring both
appellant's statutory right and the rights afforded her
under the property division at divorce seems unjustly harsh.
It is submitted that the Court should hold that the
appellant has at least a 337o interest in the property,
representing the wife's statutory interest transmuted into
a property division at: divorce.

This author has been unable

to locate any cases on this point in Utah.

In other states,

the relationship between the wife's statutory interest and
divorce awards can be summarized as taking two forms. Either
1) the wife's statutory interest after divorce, or 2) the
wife's statutory interest by an award of lump-sum alimony,
or some other provision.

In either case, it is inferentially

recognized that the two interests are related, and that the
overriding concern of each is to provide for the wife. 25 Am
Jur 2d 195, Dower and Curtesy § 147.
Defendants are really not prejudiced in any way be
a holding that a property award in a divorce case perpetuates
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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At the trial, A, V.

Hamilton, father of the defendant, Robert Hamilton,
testified that he provided the money to buy the property
in issue "for the benefit of the Hamilton family, for the
wife and children/1 (Transcript, P. 7, lines 28 and 29).
He put it in his son's name alone, on advice of counsel
that the wife would have a statutory right and the family
interest would therefore be protected, (Transcript, P. 3,
lines 27-30 and P. 9, lines 1-4).
D.

The inadequate consideration paid by the

respondents for the subject property indicates a willingness
by the respondents to take the property subject to the
interests of the appellant.
The respondents Poulsens claim they paid for the
land with $3,500.00 cash (D 4

: 21-23) and a truck and

trailer which were 13 and 17 years old, purchased earlier
by the Poulsens for $7,500.00, but which were valued for
consideration purposes at $8,500.00! (Interrogatories,
answers on February 16, 1972).

At the trial on June 25,

1973, the appraiser Ken Esplin valued the real property at
$38,000.00 plus.

(T [1973] 18

; 11-15).

Thus, even

assuming the old truck and trailer to be worth what
respondents claim, they still bought the property for only
30% of its true value.
Respondents Poulsen knew, prior to their purchase
of the land from Robert Hamilton, that he had been married,.
-10-
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and even inquired as to the whereabouts of his wife. (D 6
1. 18). Hamilton told him he was divorced that his wife
left and went to California.

Poulsen testified that he told

Hamilton "if he was still married, he couldn't sell the
property."

(D 11 1. 2 ) . The matter was brought up again

by Poulsenfs accountant at the time of closing (D 13 1. 8 ) .
No contact was ever signed, and Poulsen made no effort to
verify Hamilton's statement regarding the status of the
divorce, though it would have been very easy to do so.
(D 12).

Under such circumstances, Poulsen should have been

put on inquiry, and charged with notice of what inquiry
at that time would have revealed, to-wit: that the seller
was not divorced, that the land was still subject to the
wife's statutory interest, and that the wife had asked the
Court for a one-half interest in the property.

The gross

inadequacy of consideration, and the haste and informal
nature of the sale all suggest that the Poulsens may have
suspected the true state of affairs, and were willing to
gamble on title for the low price they were paying.
E.

Judicial acceptance of this transaction could

encourage violation of the criminal code.
One other consideration which may be mentioned is
that Section 76-20-10, Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended)
makes it a felony for a married man to falsely represent
himself as unmarried, and under such representation, wilfully
convey real estate in Utah without the consent of his wife,
-11Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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when such consent is necessary to relinquish her inchoate
statutory interest. If a husband is permitted, on the civil
side of the law, to succeed in cutting off his wifefs
rights by doing this, it will only encourage more widespread
violation of this criminal statute.
CONCLUSION
On the basis of the foregoing statutes and authorities,
it is submitted that the Court should adopt a rule, which
protects the family, by holding that:
(A) Under the circumstances of this case, respondents
Poulsen were charged with notice of the then pending
Hamilton divorce, and have taken title only to the interest
that was subsequently awarded to Robert Hamilton, to-wit:
an undivided one-half interest as a tenant in common.
(B)

In the alternative, and should the Court not

make the foregoing ruling, it is submitted the Court should
find that the Defendants took title subject to appellant's
interest of one-third, and that such interest has been
converted by virtue of the divorce decree, pro tanto, into
a one-third interest in the real property, with the right
of appellant to recover the difference between said onethird and one-half (or one-sixth of the proceeds or reasonable market value of the property) from her husband, Robert
Earl Hamilton.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED,
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